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I Comments I
"What's in a Name?": An Attempt To
Resolve the "Analytic Ambiguity" of the
Designated and Limited Public Fora
Ronnie J. Fischer*
I. Introduction
What signifies knowing the Names,
ifyou know not the Natures of Things?1
Traditional public forum. Designated public forum. Limited public
forum. Nonpublic forum. A first-time student of the public forum
doctrine might look at these otherwise unassuming words and
offhandedly ask: "What's in a name? ' 2 Much, it turns out. Often the
entire outcome of a public forum doctrine case depends on it? As
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2003; B.A., Northwestern University, 1999; M.A., McGill University, 2001.
The author would like to thank her husband, Christopher S. Fischer, and her family for
their love and support throughout the writing of this comment.
1. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK (1750).
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RoMEo AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1 (William Lyon Phelps
ed., Yale Univ. Press 1923).
3. This is because courts attach to these names particular levels of constitutional
review, which leads to fairly predictable outcomes. See infra text accompanying notes 9-
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important as these names are, however, even public forum doctrine
veterans disagree on the exact natures of these names.4 The words hardly
explain themselves, and can easily mislead interpreters.5 Nowhere is this
confusion greater than in the case of the intermediate categories of public
fora, where both the natures6 and even the names7 of these categories are
anything but certain.
Unlike the shape of a rose, 8 the contours of the intermediate
categories of public fora remain indistinct, frustrating attempts to define
consistently these fluid, abstract principles. That which one court calls a
"limited public forum" might by some other, or the same, name represent
a contradictory collection of ideas in a different jurisdiction, 9 or even in
the same jurisdiction.' 0 This gives rise to one of the principal paradoxes
in First Amendment jurisprudence: the names of the categories of public
fora are of preeminent importance; yet, neither judges" nor attorneys'
2
13.
4. See, e.g., Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1524 (1lth Cir. 1992)
(Clark, J., dissenting) ("In this First Amendment free speech case we find ourselves in a
quandary over labels: public forum, limited public forum, or non-public forum."); see
also infra text accompanying notes 11-12.
5. In some jurisdictions, for example, to qualify as a "limited public forum" a
location must be open to indiscriminate use by the general public-and thus is not in fact
"limited" at all-while a "nonpublic forum" is not a private forum. See Estiverne v. La.
State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 378 (5th Cir. 1989) (commenting on "the misleading
nature" of the labels applied to different types of fora).
6. For example, one Second Circuit judge believes that, to qualify as a limited
public forum, a location must be open to the public at large. Fighting Finest v. Bratton,
95 F.3d 224, 230 n.5 (2d Cir. 1996). Another judge on the Second Circuit, however,
believes that a limited public forum may be open to less than the entire populace. Id. at
230 n.6.
7. See, e.g., Ethredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (11 th Cir. 1992) (referring to
the intermediate category as the "created public forum"); see also United States v.
Albertini, 710 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1983) (referring to the intermediate category
as the "temporary public forum"), rev'd, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
8. The famed accompanying sentence of the quote cited previously, see supra note
2, reads: "That which we call a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet."
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, act 2, sc. 1.
9. Compare M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Def., 791 F.2d
1466, 1472 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (stating that the designated and limited public fora are
interchangeable and that they both receive strict scrutiny review), with Gentala v. City of
Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the nonpublic and limited
public fora are interchangeable and that they both receive rational basis review).
10. The Second Circuit, for example, has said, at different times, that the limited
public forum is the same as the designated public forum and that the limited public forum
is a subset of the designated public forum. Compare Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty.
Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the designated and
limited public fora are interchangeable), with Travis v. Owego-Appalachian Sch. Dist.,
927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the limited public forum is a subset of the
designated public forum).
11. See, e.g., Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 67 F.3d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.
1995) (stating, in the span of one page, that limited public fora are governed by the same
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can seem to agree upon what the intermediate categories should be called
or how they should be differentiated from the other categories of public
fora. As a result of the confusion among the categories, courts may
classify the same or similar locations under different names, and because
particular-if sometimes differing-standards of review are attached to
these names, these courts may reach contrary results.
3
According to standard public forum doctrine analysis, 4 a court must
first decide that a particular form of suppressed expression qualifies as
"protected expression" under the First Amendment, and that the
suppression is occurring at the hands of a "state actor."' 5 The court must
then decide to which of the categories of public fora the property to
which access is being sought belongs.1 6 This categorization will in turn
determine the type of review the state actor's suppressive conduct will
receive. 17 Under the current all-or-nothing analysis of the United StatesSupreme Court, this review is limited to either strict scrutiny8 or rational
standard as traditional public fora-strict scrutiny-and that limited public fora are
indistinguishable from nonpublic fora-with both receiving rational basis review).
12. See, e.g., Gen. Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 279 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1997) (stating that it was unclear whether appellees were trying to use the term
"limited public forum" as a sub-category of the designated public forum, or whether they
were trying to implicate a "designated public forum"); see also Summum v. Callaghan,
130 F.3d 906, 914 (10th Cir. 1997) (remarking that it was unclear whether plaintiff's use
of the term "limited public forum" referred to a designated public forum or a nonpublic
forum).
13. Compare Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that a
Kentucky State University yearbook constituted a limited public forum subject to strict
scrutiny review and reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
University), with Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941
F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding a school yearbook to be a nonpublic forum and
concluding that the school district did not violate a family planning program's First
Amendment rights by refusing to publish its advertisements).
14. The public forum doctrine has had its fair share of critics over the years,
including most recently Justice O'Connor in her "swing opinion" in International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), in which she advocated a
more flexible standard that would employ a sliding-scale approach to balance the benefits
and costs of free speech in each particular setting. See also Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier
& Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 703 (7th Cir. 1998). Despite some dissatisfaction
with the public forum doctrine, however, a court has yet to deviate from this set of
guidelines, which has become entrenched in First Amendment jurisprudence.
15. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio
Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1998).
16. See id.
17. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(stating that the nature of the property at issue determines the level of constitutional
scrutiny to be applied).
18. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that
traditional, designated, and limited public fora receive strict scrutiny review, while
nonpublic fora receive rational basis review).
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basis.19 The type of review that the government's conduct receives will
almost always determine the outcome of the case. Few state actors have
passed the strict scrutiny test in First Amendment cases; 20 in contrast,
few have failed the rational basis test.
21
Thus, the categorization of the property at issue is of utmost
importance in First Amendment cases. Yet, despite its significance, the
process of categorizing government property has become riddled with
ambiguity. Most of this confusion centers around the existence of a
middle category located somewhere between public fora and nonpublic
fora. Although the majority of courts have accepted that at least one
middle category does exist, 22 there is great confusion over the nature of
this category and its relationship to the other categories.23
Courts have developed two alternatives for a middle category: the
designated public forum 24 and the limited public forum. 25 Some courts
do not distinguish between a designated and a limited public forum, and
apply strict scrutiny to either.26 Other courts locate the limited public
19. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995) (stating that limited public fora and nonpublic fora receive rational basis
review, while traditional public fora receive strict scrutiny review).
20. See, e.g., Deida v. City of Milwaukee, 176 F. Supp. 2d 859, 864 (E.D. Wis.
2001) (commenting that strict scrutiny is "the most exacting standard of review" and that
any ordinances analyzed under it are "much less likely" to survive a First Amendment
challenge than those analyzed under a more forgiving standard). But see Marcus v. Iowa
Pub. Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 1996) (agreeing, for purposes of an
emergency petition for injunctive relief, that Iowa Public Television had a compelling
interest in limiting access to newsworthy candidates, that its methods were narrowly
tailored, and that it had left open substantial access to other fora).
21. See, e.g., DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 750-51 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (finding that school had a rational reason for refusing to allow a second-grade
student to show a videotape of herself singing a song at a local church).
22. Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 345 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that
the acceptance of a middle category is widely accepted).
23. The confusion surrounding the designated and limited public fora has grown into
such an impasse that it has become routine for any court discussing a public forum case
to meditate on the confusion in its opinion. See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067,
1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (commenting that "[t]he designated public forum has been the
source of much confusion"); DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001)
(meditating on the "analytic ambiguity" of the public forum doctrine); Chiu v. Plano
Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Fighting Finest v.
Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 225-28 (2d Cir. 1996) (commenting on the Supreme Court's
"mixed signals" as to the criteria for establishing a limited public forum); Nat'l Ass'n of
Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 874 F. Supp. 530, 532 (D.R.I. 1995) (commenting on the
"murky status" of the public forum doctrine).
24. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
(labeling explicitly the intermediate category of public forum the "designated public
forum").
25. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (referring to the intermediate category as the "limited public forum").
26. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2001).
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forum as a subset of the designated public forum, and also apply strict
scrutiny to both.27 Still other courts locate the limited public forum as a
subset of the nonpublic forum, and apply only rational basis to both.28
Part II of this comment will present a brief historical overview of
the public forum doctrine, with an emphasis on the formation (and
formulation) of the designated and limited public fora. Parts III and IV
will examine the varying ways in which courts have interpreted the terms
"designated public forum" and "limited public forum," looking first at
relevant United States Supreme Court cases and then at recent circuit
court interpretations of these decisions, respectively.
Part V of this comment proposes a new solution to the problem of
the public forum doctrine's various forum names and meanings by
suggesting that courts first recognize designated and limited public fora
as discrete categories. Under this proposal, courts would combine, and
expand upon, the paths already taken by the Second and Fourth Circuits,
which apply not one but two levels of review to limited public fora.
29
This bifurcated analysis would reflect the ways in which limited public
fora may be seen as both designated public fora and nonpublic fora,
depending on the position of the speaker in relation to the established
class. These standards of review should be based on whether the
excluded speaker falls within the class for which the forum has been
established. If the speaker falls within the class, a strict scrutiny standard
of review should apply. However, if the speaker does not fall within the
class, only a rational basis standard should apply. To ensure that
government does not try to limit the class in an unfairly narrow manner,
if the court initially determines that the excluded speaker falls outside of
the class, the court should subject the government's designation of the
class to its own rational basis review to ensure that government acted
reasonably in limiting the class.3 °
II. "The Problems of Speech in Public Places": A Brief History of the
Public Forum Doctrine
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution broadly
directs that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech.",31 While this may appear to guarantee all Americans absolute
freedom of speech at all times, this freedom is, in fact, qualified.32 Only
27. See, e.g., Crowder v. Hous. Auth., 990 F.2d 586, 591 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
28. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 575 (7th Cir. 2001).
29. See, e.g., Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 188 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Fighting Finest v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 225-28 (2d Cir. 1996).
30. See Warren, 196 F.3d at 194.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953) (stating that First
2003]
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speech that the Court has determined to be "protected expression" may
not be abridged.33 Thus, one cannot, for example, yell "Fire!" in a
crowded theater, as such "words of incitement" do not qualify as
"protected expression., 34 Similarly, the Court has declared obscenity, 35
child pornography, 36 "fighting words, 37 libel, 38 and certain "vulgar,
offensive or shocking" material 39 to be unprotected forms of expression.
The reach of the First Amendment also depends on the status of the
actor attempting to abridge protected expression, because the First
Amendment applies only to governmental entities. 40 Thus, one cannot
commandeer the house or backyard of a private landowner, who has the
right to exclude others based solely on what they say. 41 A more difficult
question is raised when the access being sought is to property owned or
regulated by government. On one hand, an articulated goal of the First
Amendment is to assure that those individuals who may not be able to
afford other expressive outlets have a place to express their beliefs,42
facilitating political and societal changes through peaceful and lawful
means.43 On the other hand, courts recognize that not all government
property is created equal. Some government properties serve purposes
other than public discussion,44 such as delivering mail 45 or transporting
individuals from one place to another. Such non-expressive purposes
could easily be interrupted if expressive activity was permitted at these
locales. No one would likely think it proper, for example, to allow a
Amendment principles are not to be treated as a promise that everyone may go to a public
place at any time and express their opinions).
33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (recognizing that certain
speech is beyond the bounds of the First Amendment and therefore constitutes
"unprotected" expression). A reviewing court must also determine that the actions
subject to regulation constitute "expression" rather than "conduct," because conduct may
be regulated or prohibited without being subject to First Amendment issues. Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that standing,
patrolling, or marching on streets constitutes conduct, not speech, and as such may be
regulated or prohibited).
34. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
35. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1967); see also Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
36. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
37. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
38. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
39. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
40. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 280 (1984).
41. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
42. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
43. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,467 (1980).
44. See Adderley v. Florida, 358 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
129 (1981) (finding that mailbox did not constitute a public forum because it is primarily
involved in the delivery of mail).
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rock concert in the reading room of a public library, or an anti-war
protest on the grounds of Arlington Cemetery, because the essence of
46both locations is a quiet atmosphere.
Assuming that both protected expression and state action are
involved, "the problems of speech in public places ''47 have come to be
controlled by the public forum doctrine. This doctrine has evolved to
take a categorical approach to answering such questions.48 The category
of property, once established, dictates the level of review the Court will
give the denial of expression,49 and, in practice, will determine the
outcome of the case. If one seeks access to a parcel of property
categorized as a "traditional public forum" or "designated public forum,"
the individual will likely be successful. 50 If, on the other hand, one seeks
access to a piece of property that the reviewing court designates as a
"nonpublic forum," the individual will be unlikely to obtain that access.51
46. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). The state may have
additional interests in propagating reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. For
example, two parades cannot march on the same street at the same time, Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding local ordinance forbidding unlicensed
street parades as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction), and holding a parade
on a large street during rush hour might intolerably burden a city's flow of traffic. Thus,
government may enact a reasonable regulation restricting the hours at which groups may
demonstrate or hold parades on the city's streets. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554
(1965). At the same time, government may prohibit parades altogether from a place like
the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. N.J. Sports &
Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1982) (dicta) (stating that government could
prohibit parades on the Pennsylvania Turnpike).
47. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SuP. CT. REv. 1, 12.
48. See, e.g., Leventhal v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D. Cal.
1997) (stating that "the modem categorical approach" to public forum analysis began
with Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37
(1983)). Courts have generalized the public forum's categorical methodology even
further by looking at the abstract properties of the particular type of public forum in
general. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (inquiring into the abstract properties
of military installations in general rather than the particular military installation at issue
in the case).
49. See, e.g., Toward Gayer Bicentennial Comms. v. R.I. Bicentennial Found., 717
F. Supp. 632, 637 (D.R.I. 1976) (stating that "the key" to plaintiff's case is which
category of public forum the location in question constituted).
50. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(stating that the nature of the property determines the level of constitutional scrutiny to be
applied); see also United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1238, 1240 (1 1th Cir. 2000)
(classifying a national park as a traditional public forum and striking down the
government's permit scheme); United Food & Commer. Workers Union, Local 1099 v.
Southwest Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a state agency
created a designated public forum and failed to show a compelling reason for excluding
plaintiffs controversial advertisement).
51. See, e.g., Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1986)
(declaring Kennedy Stadium to be a nonpublic forum and finding the government's
exclusion of rock music reasonable).
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Although the outcomes in cases involving traditional, designated,
and nonpublic fora are relatively predictable, the outcomes in cases
involving locations categorized as limited public fora are in a state of
confusing disequilibrium. In the fewer cases in which a forum is
categorized as a "limited public forum," the success of one seeking
access to such a location depends on the reviewing court's interpretation
of the "limited public forum" category.52 Thus, the deciding factor in
public forum cases is not what one says or even where one says it, but
the classification method used by the court.
A. Open Spaces vs. Public Places: Early Analyses of Public
Expression and Traditional Concepts of Property Law
The roots of the public forum doctrine can be found in early
attempts by courts to protect speech in general, regardless of where the
attempt at expression took place. Before the Court held freedom of
speech to be a right of personal liberty secured through the Fourteenth
Amendment,53 government could abridge an individual's right to speak
on government property just as a private owner could.54 Courts reached
this conclusion by applying traditional principles of property law,
analogizing a government proprietor to a private landowner.
5 5
After the First Amendment was held applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment,5 6 this analogy no longer carried the day.57
In Hague v. CIO,58 Justice Roberts, speaking for a three-Justice plurality,
rejected the municipality's argument that it owned the streets and parks
within its bounds and could exclude anyone it wanted as a private owner
could.59 Justice Roberts relied on other principles of property law to
52. Compare Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding Kentucky
State University yearbook to be a limited public forum and determining that the
University's confiscation of yearbooks failed to pass strict scrutiny review), with
Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937 (5th Cir. 2000) (denying
plaintiffs petition for rehearing on ground that defendant school board created a limited
public forum but reasonably excluded religious services and partisan political activities
from the school).
53. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
54. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
55. See id. (upholding Boston preacher's conviction for sermonizing in the Boston
Common without a permit because municipality owned the Common and as such could
control access to the park as it wished).
56. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
57. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Although this analogy may no longer
control public forum analysis, it nonetheless still carries some force, and courts continue
to refer to this principle in public forum doctrine cases. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 836-37 (1976) (stating that the state, no less than a private property owner, has
the power to restrict speech on its grounds).
58. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
59. Id. at 514-15.
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determine (albeit in dictum) that streets and parks have "immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. 6 °  According to Justice
Roberts, such use of the streets and public parks was a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens "from ancient
times. 61
Years later, in 1965, Professor Harry Kalven officially put a name
to the concept expressed in Justice Roberts's dictum.62 While addressing
what he referred to as "the problems of speech in public places,"
Professor Kalven identified streets, parks and other public places as
"public forums" that citizens should be able to commandeer for public
discussion.63
B. The Background to the Development of the Limited Public Forum:
Selective Exclusions and the Rise of Equal Protection Claims
Hague typified early public forum doctrine cases in that it involved
an ordinance that prohibited anyone from engaging in expressive activity
in a particular locale.64 Eventually, however, cases arose involving
ordinances that prohibited some individuals from engaging in expressive
conduct but allowed other individuals to engage in the same conduct.
65
These cases involving selective exclusions inevitably led to claims under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 Equal
Protection claims are closely intertwined with both First Amendment
claims in general 67 and limited public forum claims in particular, as both
tend to involve cases in which some individuals are permitted to engage
60. Id.
61. Id at 515.
62. Kalven, supra note 47, at 12.
63. Id.
64. The ordinance in Hague, for example, prohibited anyone from holding a public
meeting in the street or any other public place without first obtaining a permit. Hague,
307 U.S. at 503.
65. One early case, for example, involved a group of Jehovah's Witnesses'
unsuccessful attempts to hold a religious meeting in a public park. Other groups,
however, were permitted to conduct religious services in the same park. Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (invalidating the municipal ordinance in question on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
66. The Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The effect
of the Equal Protection Clause is to assure that similarly situated individuals are treated
similarly. E.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
67. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (stating that government action permitting some
individuals to speak but denying the opportunity to others raises an Equal Protection
claim that is closely related to First Amendment interests).
2003]
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in free expression while others are not.68 The most influential of these
cases has been Police Department v. Mosley.69
Mosley involved a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing or
demonstrating "on a public way" within 150 feet of any school building
while school was in session, with an exception for peaceful picketing of
a school involved in a labor dispute. 70 The Court analyzed the ordinance
in light of the Equal Protection Clause, as the ordinance effectively
treated some picketing differently from others.71 The Court stated that,
once government opens a forum to some groups, it may not prohibit
other individuals or groups from expressing themselves in the same
forum on the basis of what the individuals intend to say.72 Only if
Chicago found that other picketing was specifically more disruptive than
peaceful labor picketing would the city be able to restrict such
picketing.73  The Court found the Chicago ordinance to be
unconstitutional because it was a content-based exclusion, which "is
never permitted.,
74
C. The Birth of the "Designated Public Forum" and "Limited Public
Forum " Doctrines
Mosley and other dual Equal Protection-First Amendment cases
established that government officials may not discriminate against a
particular individual or group based on the officials' personal feelings
toward either the group or their expressive activity.75 Still to be
addressed was whether government could limit the expressive activity in
a forum based on more rational criteria.76 As the Court struggled with
the answer to this question it stumbled upon the concept of the limited
public forum.
Courts originally conceived of what would become the limited
68. Selective exclusions often form the basis for Equal Protection claims because
such exclusions suggest that government is treating similarly situated individuals
differently by virtue of their exclusion. See, e.g., id. At the same time, the fact that some
people are allowed to speak and others are not suggests that government may have
created a limited public forum, since a certain group of individuals is allowed to engage
in expressive activity.
69. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
70. Id. at 94.
71. That is, by allowing peaceful picketing of a school involved in a labor dispute
but not allowing any other type of picketing. Id. at 94-95.
72. Id. at 96.
73. Id. at 100.
74. Id.
75. United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343, 349-50
(W. Va. 1983) (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96).
76. That is, other than by propagating reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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public forum in terms of the "transformation principle. 77 According to
this principle, government, through some affirmative action, could
"transform" a nonpublic forum into something more. 78 This "something
more" would nonetheless still be something less than a full-fledged
traditional public forum because it would not be required to be open
indiscriminately to everyone.
The Supreme Court developed the transformation principle in 1981
in Widmar v. Vincent.79 The selective exclusion at issue in Widmar dealt
with a forum that the state university had opened to all other registered
student groups except an organization of evangelical Christian students.80
In dicta, the Widmar Court noted that a state may not selectively exclude
individuals or groups from a forum that it had opened generally to the
public. 81 This rule applies even when government opens its forum to the
public by choice rather than by order.
82
In stating this rule, the Widmar Court hinted at the possibility of a
third public forum, a middle category somewhere between a traditional
public forum and a nonpublic forum.83 The facts of the case lent
themselves to the formulation of such a rule, as the Court categorized the
university at issue in the case as a forum distinctly unlike a traditional
public forum. 84 In performing the appropriate public forum analysis, the
Court categorized the attempted exclusion as a content-based restriction
on speech, and as such subjected it to a strict scrutiny test.85 Not being
able to locate an appropriate justification for this exclusion, the Court
struck down the university's policy.
86
D. Perry's Tripartite Delineation of the Categories of Public Fora
In the same line as Widmar came Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators' Association,87 another case involving selective
exclusion school property. Unlike Widmar, Perry involved a public
school system in Indiana that opened up its interschool mail system to
Perry Education Association (PEA), recently elected as the exclusive
77. Pfeifer v. City of West Allis, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259-60 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
78. Id. at 1260.
79. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
80. Id. at 264-65.
81. Id. at 267-68.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 268 (stating that a university represents a more unique public forum
because its mission is education for its students).
85. Id. at 270.
86. Id.
87. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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bargaining representative of the school district's teachers. 88 The school
district also allowed local parochial schools, church groups, the YMCA,
and the Cub Scouts to use its mail system.89 PLEA was not, however,
prevented from using other school facilities, such as bulletin boards or
the school announcement system, to communicate with teachers. 90
Without much ado or explanation, the Perry Court set out the three
main categories that today control public forum doctrine analysis. 9 1 As
the first category the Court named the traditional public forum, which it
defined as a public place that had been devoted to assembly and debate
by either "long tradition or government fiat."92 Within this category the
Court delineated a spectrum of "public forumness," with the
"quintessential public forums" described in Hague-primarily public
parks and streets
93-- on the far end.
94
The Court further differentiated between two kinds of restrictions
within public fora in general: content-based exclusions and content-
neutral exclusions.95 The Court stated that the former type of restriction
should receive strict scrutiny, meaning that the regulation will be upheld
only when government can show that it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. 96 In addition, the state may enact "reasonable"
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.97  For such a
restriction to be valid, government must show that it is necessary to serve
a substantial state interest, that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that
88. Id. at 39.
89. Id. at 39 n.2.
90. Id. at 39-40.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 884 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (stating
that the Supreme Court in Perry set out the framework for analyzing First Amendment
challenges to governmental regulation).
92. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
93. Id.
94. Although the traditional public forum category has been generally limited to
public parks and streets, it has also been found to include state capitol grounds, Lederman
v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51-52 (D.D.C. 2001), the United States Supreme
Court sidewalk, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983), public thoroughfares
in National and Dulles Airports, U.S. Southwest Afr./Namib. Trade & Cultural Council v.
United States, 708 F.2d 760, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1983); but see Jacobsen v. City of Rapid
City, 128 F.3d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 1997), and national parks, United States v. Frandsen,
212 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) (involving government concession that national
parks constituted traditional public fora).
95. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Thus, when a restriction is found to be content-based, the
classification of the location as a traditional, designated, limited, or nonpublic forum will
be irrelevant to the outcome of the case.
96. Id. This accords with Equal Protection analysis, which mandates that, when
government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum,
the legislation must be "finely tailored" to serve a substantial state interest, and the
justifications offered for any distinctions must be carefully scrutinized. Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
97. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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interest, and that ample alternative channels of communication remain
98open.
At the other end of ihe spectrum the Court described those types of
public property that were neither by tradition nor by designation open to
the public for communication.9 9 This second type of forum became
known as the nonpublic forum, an unfortunate misnomer because the
designation of a forum as "nonpublic" does not mean that it is private,
only that it has not been opened to the public in the reviewing court's
eyes.' 00 The Perry Court gave as the appropriate level of review for
cases involving nonpublic fora the rational basis test, if the exclusion is
not viewpoint- or content-based. 10 As part of its rationale, the Court
once again revived the proposition that the state may regulate property it
owns no less than a private landowner.'0 2 The Court further reasoned
that implicit in the concept of a nonpublic forum is the right to exclude
on the basis of either speaker identity or intended subject matter. 1
03
Somewhere between these two extremes the Court located a middle
ground. As the third and final category the Court recognized the
existence of the intermediate category hinted at in Widmar.10 4 Without
actually describing or naming it, the Court explained that this category
consisted of public property that the State has opened for use by the
public in general as a place for expressive activity. 10 5 The Court noted
that a state might not be required to open a forum to the public, 0 6 but
that, once it did so, it would be bound by the same strict scrutiny analysis
as the traditional public forum.1
07
The Court never gave a name to this middle category of forum.
However, the Court's reference to "public property that is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication,'' 0 8 gave rise
by negative implication to the middle category being called the
98. Id.; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (stating
that the government's regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's
legitimate, content-neutral interests-but need not be the least restrictive means
available-and must leave open ample channels of communication).
99. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
100. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 941 (7th Cir. 1996).
101. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Viewpoint- and content-based discrimination receive
strict scrutiny review. Id. at 45.
102. Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981)).
103. Id. at 49.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. This is unlike traditional public fora, such as streets and parks, which are
required to be opened to the public, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. See id. at 45.
107. Id. at 45-46.
108. Id. at 46.
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designated public forum. 0 9 In a footnote, the Court explained that a
public forum could be created for a limited purpose, such as for use by
certain limited groups or for the discussion of certain subjects." 0
PLEA argued that the school mail facilities at issue constituted the
new middle category, which it called a "limited public forum.""' The
Court, however, rejected this argument, reasoning that the school district
had not opened its mail system to indiscriminate use by the general
public. 112 Rather, any group seeking to use the school's mail system had
to ask the building principal for permission." 3 The Court stated that this
type of selective access did not transform the school's property into a
public forum. 1 4  Although the forum might be considered a limited
public forum, the constitutional right of access to it extends only to other
entities of similar character." 5 In holding that PLEA did not have a right
of access, the Court implicitly determined that PLEA, which concerned
itself with the terms and conditions of teacher employment, was not of
the same character as other groups, which the Court characterized as
engaging in "activities of relevance and educational relevance to
students," that had been permitted access.1 6 Because the restriction was
not viewpoint-based, the Court applied the rational basis test and
concluded that the school's policy was valid."i
7
Perry has been credited with definitively setting out the categories
that have guided public forum analysis." 8 Despite this achievement, the
Perry Court was not able to propose a solution that would answer many
of the questions that would inevitably arise in the wake of the heralding
of the existence of an intermediate category. By categorizing the internal
mail system as a nonpublic forum, the Perry Court did not have to give
the intermediate category anything more than a cursory, if now-famous,
mention.
109. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998)
(referring to the intermediate category as the "designated public forum").
110. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7.
111. Id. at 47.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 48. This would seem to contradict the statement that the Court made in an
earlier footnote recognizing the public fora could be created for a limited purpose, such
as allowing access only to certain groups. Id. at 45 n.7; see infra text accompanying
notes 139-40 (discussing how these may in fact be read consistently).
115. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-48.
116. Id.
117. Specifically, the Court found that the school district had an interest in preventing
the school from becoming "a battlefield for inter-union squabbles." Id. at 52.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 884 (1lth Cir. 1991) (stating
that the Supreme Court in Perry set out the framework for analyzing First Amendment
challenges to governmental regulation).
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III. Analysis of the Current Situation: Post-Perry Supreme Court Cases
A. The Evolution of Public and Nonpublic Fora in the Wake of Perry
Since Perry, numerous courts have expounded upon various aspects
of the public forum doctrine, most of them limiting the applicability of
the doctrine and expanding the ability of government to regulate
expression on its property. Several courts, for example, have fashioned a
distinction between property that government owns and property that
government merely regulates.1 19 In addition, a district court has recently
declared that a forum's status as a "traditional public forum" is not
immutable. 20 Rather, the court stated that traditional public fora do not
maintain their public forum quality for all purposes and at all times; if
government makes the case that the property is required to serve another
compelling state interest, government may create a nonpublic or limited
public forum within a traditional public forum. '21
Although many of these may be seen as limiting the public forum
doctrine to a certain extent, the public forum doctrine has also been
broadened in at least one way. The Supreme Court has stated that the
public forum doctrine applies to m6re than just physical property: it
transcends spatial and geographical confines to embrace metaphysical
fora as well, including such things as channels of communication.'
22
B. The Devolution of the Limited Public Forum in the Wake of Perry:
Conflicting Supreme Court Cases from Perry to the Present
The limited public forum, by contrast, has been the source of more
confusion than clarity in the wake of Perry. One of the first Supreme
Court cases to examine more closely the intermediate category of public
forum, and one of the most oft-cited cases, is that of Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 123 The federal government's
exclusion of certain legal defense and advocacy organizations from
participation in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), a charity drive
aimed at federal employees, 124 gave rise to Cornelius.
119. According to these courts, government should be accorded more deference when
it is the proprietor of a certain forum, so that what was once strict scrutiny review for
restrictions in certain government fora has turned into something less. See United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990).
120. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294,
315 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
121. Id.
122. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
123. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
124. Id. at 790.
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In beginning its analysis, the Court paid tribute to Perry, crediting it
with identifying the three types of fora. 125  The Cornelius Court's
interpretation of the. traditional public forum came as no surprise, as it
accorded with previous descriptions of this category. 126  The Court's
interpretations of the intermediate and nonpublic forum categories,
however, deviated from prior formulations of these categories.
In describing the middle category, which the Court called "the
public forum created by government designation," the Court reiterated
Perry's definition that such a forum could be created when government
opened a place or channel of communication for use by the public at
large.1 27  To this definition, the court added the footnote from Perry
stating that such an intermediate forum could be created for use by
certain speakers or for the discussion of certain subjects.l18 In almost the
very next sentence, however, the Court stated that government does not
create a public forum by inaction or by permitting "limited discourse,"
but only by intentionally opening a nonpublic forum for public
discourse. 129 The Court went on to name the government's intent as the
touchstone to any determination of whether government had created an
intermediate category of public forum.'
30
Applying this standard, the Court decided that government did not
intend to create a public forum because government had been very
selective in its access.131 Rather, the Court declared the CFC to be a
nonpublic forum.'
32
While Cornelius confirmed that an intermediate category of public
forum existed, the Court's descriptions of this forum and its analysis of
the plaintiffs claims have generated both confusion and criticism. 133 In
both cases, the Court acknowledged the existence of an intermediate
category of public forum, which could be limited to certain groups or
125. Id. at 802.
126. The Court described the traditional public forum by referring to the famous
quote from Perry that traditional public fora are those places that "by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." Id. (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983).
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Government allowed only charities that were tax-exempt, were non-profit, were
supported by contributions from the public, and provided direct health and welfare
services to individuals. Id. at 792.
132. Id.
133. The most famous of these critical remarks comes from Justice Blackmun's
dissent to the Cornelius majority opinion. Justice Blackmun pointed out the seeming
circularity of the majority's opinion: the CFC is not a limited public forum because
government intended to limit the forum to a particular class of speakers. Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 813-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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subjects, 134 and recognized that the fora at issue arguably would fit this
category, 135 but, in each case, the Court declared the fora to be
nonpublic. 136 Some courts have interpreted this to indicate that, in order
to qualify as a limited public forum, a location must be open to the public
at large. 1
37
At the same time, other courts have interpreted the Court's findings
in Perry and Cornelius to be consistent with Perry's language that a
middle category of public forum could be created for a limited class.
138
A closer examination of Perry and Cornelius reveals that the reason that
the Court was hesitant to name anything other than a nonpublic forum in
both cases is due to the limited access granted certain individuals. 139 As
the Court later stated, 140 the fact that government opens up a forum on a
restricted, permission-only basis suggests that the purpose of the forum is
not compatible with expressive activity.'
14
Several Supreme Court decisions following Cornelius failed to
provide any additional insights into the natures of the intermediate
categories. In these cases, the Court was able to avoid the more difficult
issues plaguing the public forum doctrine, including the question of how
to interpret the contradictory language of Cornelius. In both Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District142  and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,143 the
Court avoided analyzing a limited public forum in any depth because the
134. Id. at 802; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7.
135. See supra notes 88-89, 124 and accompanying text.
136. Cornelius, 473 U.S at 802; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
137. See, e.g., Fighting Finest v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 230 n.5 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
that one of the judges believes that, to qualify for "public use," a location or channel of
communication must be open to the public at large or to a class or group whose meetings
are open to the public at large).
138. See, e.g., id. at 230 n.6 (stating that another judge on the same court believes
that, to qualify as a limited public forum, a location or channel of communication need
not be open to the public at large, but may be open to only a particular segment of the
public).
139. In Perry, individuals seeking to use the internal mail system for communication
were required to ask the building principal for permission. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47. In
Cornelius, the excluded individuals claimed that the class consisted of all charitable
organizations. It was clearly the case that not all such organizations were allowed to
participate, however, as only 237 out of more than 850,000 groups that qualified for tax-
exempt status in 1980 were invited to participate. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
140. See Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981)).
141. Even Justice Blackmun would agree with this statement, as in his dissent he
points out that the fact that government occasionally may invite a speaker to a military
base to lecture on drug abuse does not necessarily mean that the use of the base would be
compatible with all would-be speakers, or even all those wishing to speak about drug
abuse. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 820 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
143. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
2003]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Court found both governmental restrictions to be viewpoint-based and
therefore presumptively impermissible.
144
In Lamb's Chapel, the Court mentioned and did not contradict the
lower court's interpretation that the school had opened a limited public
forum.1 45 In describing the categories of public fora, however, the Court
made reference only to the designated public forum and the nonpublic
forum. 146  The Court stated that public property that is not open to
indiscriminate use by the public for communicative purposes-which the
Court referred to as a designated public forum-is a nonpublic forum.
147
The school property was not open to the public for indiscriminate
communication, and thus the property failed to qualify as a designated
public forum.' 48 Because the Court found the school's restriction to be
viewpoint-based, however, the Court subjected the school's restriction to
strict scrutiny review. 
149
Without explaining how it reached a similar conclusion, the
Rosenberger Court referred to the school's Student Activities Fund
(SAF) as a limited public forum and announced that the state could not
exclude speakers from such a forum on the basis of their viewpoints.'
50
The Court described the rational basis test as the standard of review for
limited public fora, citing Perry and Cornelius,'5' even though Perry
provided that the rational basis test was for nonpublic fora.' 52 But,
because the Court quickly concluded that the school's restrictions
amounted to an impermissible viewpoint-based exclusion, 153 the Court
did not have to apply this rational basis test to the limited public forum.
The Supreme Court's most recent decision involving the public
forum doctrine is Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 154 which
followed in the same vein as both Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger. In
Good News, a private Christian organization for young children applied
to use a school cafeteria for after-school meetings. 55 In subjecting the
school district's refusal of the organization's application to public forum
analysis, the Court first noted that limited public fora do not receive strict
144. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387.
145. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390.
146. Id. at 392.
147. Id. at 392-93 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).




152. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
153. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
154. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
155. Id. at 103.
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scrutiny, as do traditional public fora. 5 6 Again, however, the Court
managed to avoid the issue of precisely what rules govern the
intermediate category(ies) of public fora, as the parties agreed that the
school district had created a limited public forum. 1
57
The Court noted that in a limited public forum government does not,
by definition, allow all types of expressive activity. 58 The Court then
stated that the constitutional limits placed on the ability to limit a forum
are that the restriction must be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light
of the purpose of the forum. 159 -In other words, limited public fora are
subject to only a rational basis standard of review. Because the Court
found that the restriction was viewpoint-based, 160 the Court did not have
to decide the issue of whether the school district's restriction was
reasonable in light of the school's compatibility with expressive activity.
IV. The Diverse Roads Taken by the Circuit Courts
Despite the acceptance of a middle ground between the traditional
public forum and the nonpublic forum, the courts have become
hopelessly "dazed and confused" over whether this middle ground
consists of one or two categories, and, if the latter, how they relate to one
another.' 61 Caselaw dealing with the intermediate category of public fora
has generally agreed that the main category of intermediate public forum
between the traditional public forum and the nonpublic forum is called
the "designated public forum," but beyond this the courts are in utter
disagreement.
In describing the relationship between this designated public forum
and limited public fora, courts have variously said: (1) the designated
public forum and the limited public forum are interchangeable terms
describing the same thing and both receive strict scrutiny review; 62 (2) a
limited public forum is a type of designated public forum and both
156. Id at 106.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 107 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). Although the Court cites Cornelius for this proposition, it is
important to note that the Cornelius Court stated that this level of review would be
appropriate for nonpublic fora, not limited public fora. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
160. Good News, 533 U.S. at 109.
161. See, e.g., Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 842 n.5 (6th Cir.
2000) (recognizing the uncertainty as to whether there are one or two categories of fora
other than public and nonpublic fora, and what protection is due these categories).
162. See Heartbeat of Ottawa County v. City of Port Clinton, 207 F. Supp. 2d 699,
702 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (noting that a limited public forum has alternatively been
described as a designated public forum and that limited public fora receive the same strict
scrutiny review applicable to traditional public fora).
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receive strict scrutiny review;1 63 (3) a limited public forum is a type of
nonpublic forum that receives only rational basis review;' 64 (4) a limited
public forum can be either a type of designated public forum or a type of
nonpublic forum, the former receiving strict scrutiny review and the
latter receiving only rational basis review;' 65 (5) a limited public forum is
a type of designated public forum but the limited public forum receives
only rational basis review; 166 and (6) a limited public forum is a type of
designated public forum whose standard of review depends on whether
the speaker falls inside or outside of the limiting class set by
government. 1
67
A. Circuit Courts That Have Located the Limited Public Forum Under
the Designated Public Forum and Applied Strict Scrutiny Review to
Both
In the first category are those courts that have interpreted Supreme
Court precedent to say that the limited public forum is either the same as
or a subset of the designated public forum, and that both designated and
limited public fora should receive strict scrutiny review. Courts in the
First,168 Third, 169 Sixth, 170 Eighth,' 7 ' Eleventh, 172 and D.C. 173 Circuits
163. See Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1553 n.10 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the second category of public fora is the designated public forum, which may be of
the limited or unlimited type, both of which types receive strict scrutiny review) (citing
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)).
164. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir.
1999) (interpreting Supreme Court precedent as stating that a limited public forum is a
subset of the nonpublic forum).
165. See Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
166. See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating
that, if a forum is "merely a 'limited public forum,"' the court must apply a
reasonableness test rather than a strict scrutiny test).
167. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of New York
Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534 (2d Cir. 2002).
168. See New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 (lst Cir.
2002) (stating that a designated public forum is sometimes called a limited public forum).
169. See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 185
(3d Cir. 1999) (noting the confusion between the designated public forum and the limited
public forum and applying the same strict scrutiny review to both).
170. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
intermediate category has been alternatively referred to as the "designated public forum"
and the "limited public forum" and finding that strict scrutiny review applies to both).
171. See Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 675 n.ll (8th Cir. 1997) (using the terms
interchangeably, and deciding to refer to the intermediate category by the term "limited
public. forum") (citing ISKON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 686 (1992)).
172. See M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Def., 791 F.2d 1466,
1472 (1 lth Cir. 1986).
173. See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247, 1256-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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have taken this particular path. The most instructive case for examining
the potential shortcomings of this type of categorization can be seen in
the Eleventh Circuit case of Chandler v. Georgia Public
Telecommunications Commission.
174
In Chandler, the Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission
(GPTC) sought to broadcast a political debate between the Democratic
and Republican candidates for Georgia's lieutenant governor. 75 Two
Libertarian candidates for lieutenant governor, however, were not
allowed to participate in the debate.176 The Libertarians sued GPTC,
alleging both First Amendment and Equal Protection violations. 177
Although the majority's First Amendment analysis fails even to
mention any of the names of the public forum categories, it is clear that
the court was otherwise following a public forum doctrine analysis. As
the first step in its First Amendment analysis, the court stated that, when
the channel of communication does not function as a "marketplace of
ideas," the state may regulate the content of the channel. 78 Because
GPTC was not a medium open to everyone regardless of the nature of the
message, 179 it was not a true marketplace of ideas. 80 Because the court
concluded that GPTC's refusal was reasonable and not based on
viewpoint discrimination,' 8' the court instructed the district court to
dismiss the Libertarians' complaint.'
82
Although disagreeing with the ultimate outcome of the case and
clarifying perceived flaws in the majority's reasoning,' 83 the dissent
otherwise endorsed the majority's public forum analysis. The dissent
began its public forum analysis by stating the taxonomy of fora created
by Perry: traditional public fora, "created public forums,' ' 184 and
174. 917 F.2d 486 (1lth Cir. 1990).
175. Id. at 488.
176. Id. GPTC instead offered the Libertarians thirty minutes of airtime to present
their views. Id. at 488 n. 1.
177. Id.
178. Id. This description resembles that of a designated public forum. See Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
179. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 488 n.1. The court found that GPTC made editorial
decisions on a daily basis as to which programs to broadcast, and that choosing to
broadcast one program necessarily meant that the exclusion of other programs during that
period. Id. at 488-89.
180. Id. at 488.
181. Id. at 489 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
182. Id. at 490.
183. Judge Clark believed that GPTC had engaged in viewpoint discrimination and
that GPTC should be enjoined from refusing to permit the Libertarian candidates to
participate in the debate. Id. at 491-92 (Clark, J., dissenting).
184. The "created public forum" category corresponds to both the designated public
forum and the limited public forum categories in Cornelius. See Cornelius, 473 U.S at
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nonpublic fora. 185 In elucidating the created public forum category, the
dissent quoted language from Cornelius stating that such a forum may be
opened for the public at large or for only a small segment of the
public. 186 The dissent reasoned, however, that government did not create
such a created public forum because GPTC did not invite the general
public to appear on GPTC's network and express its opinions on the
election. 187  Instead, the dissent stated that the GPTC debate was a
nonpublic forum.'
88
If GPTC had qualified as either a limited, designated, or "created"
public forum, it would have been automatically subject to strict scrutiny
review under the Eleventh Circuit's analysis. 189  By subjecting all
property that the court finds is not a nonpublic forum to the nearly-
impossible-to-pass strict scrutiny review, this approach would ostensibly
seem to be more protective of speech. There are two problems with this
cursory conclusion, however. First, as the Chandler case demonstrates,
courts have been generally reluctant to classify fora as designated or
limited. 90 This is likely because they are aware that in doing so they
802.
185. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 491 (Clark, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
188. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
190. A LexisNexis search performed on December 15, 2002, comparing the number
of limited public fora actually found by the various courts in relation to the number of
cases in which one of the parties alleged a limited public forum, showed that the circuits
falling into this category were much less likely to classify a particular location as a
limited public forum. The First Circuit found one limited public forum in seven public
forum cases where one of the parties alleged a limited public forum. Yeo v. Town of
Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13198, at *56 (1st Cir. Jan. 6, 1997)
(finding that high school newspaper and yearbook advertising spaces constituted limited
public fora), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 131 F.3d 241, 255 (1st Cir. 1997). The
Third Circuit classified three locations as limited public fora out of thirteen limited public
forum cases. United States v. Goldin, 311 F.3d 191(3d Cir. 2002) (stating that the parties
agreed that the Liberty Bell pavilion at issue was a limited public forum, but finding that
the expressive activity attempted was outside the class to which the forum had been
limited); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1263 n.24 (3d Cir. 1992)
(classifying library as a limited public forum and finding that the library's rules that
resulted in the expulsion of a homeless individual for smelling offensive and disrupting
other patrons survived strict scrutiny review); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d
1366, 1380 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding high school auditorium constituted a "limited open
forum"). The Sixth Circuit named two limited public fora in ten limited public forum
cases. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding student yearbook
constituted a limited public forum); Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 93-3231, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 31576, at *19 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994) (finding
school board meeting to be a limited public forum). The Eighth Circuit did not
conclusively name any designated or limited public fora in nineteen limited public forum
cases. The Eleventh Circuit found three limited public fora in sixteen limited public
forum cases. Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir.
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almost automatically doom the government's restriction unless it can be
classified as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.'
91
Second, although this approach may be very speech-protective for
those select fora that have been placed into the categories of "designated
public forum" or "limited public forum," the inherent weaknesses of this
analysis have undermined its application. If the court automatically
submits the government's decision to open a forum to any kind of public
activity to strict scrutiny review, there are three likely outcomes. First,
government is more likely to take the safe option of leaving the property
closed to all discourse.1 92 Second, government is more likely to adopt a
very selective, permission-only policy of permitting limited
expression.1 93  Finally, government may even be likely to sell the
location in question to a private company that will not be subject to the
confines of the First Amendment.' 94 As the Eleventh Circuit noted in
Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller,195 once the state decides to designate a
public forum, "the monkey is on the state's back."' 96 In Miller, this
meant that, once Georgia designated a government building as a public
forum, it was Georgia's responsibility to ensure that reasonable observers
of the plaintiffs menorah display located on the property did not
mistakenly believe that Georgia endorses Judaism. 97 In a more general
sense, it means that, once it opens a forum, government has certain
responsibilities, which include granting equal access to all those within
the designated class. Both of these situations are conducive to less, not
more, expression.
1997) (finding that the university opened up a limited public forum); Chabad-Lubavitch
v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1391 (11th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with the lower court that the
rotunda of the capitol building constituted a limited public forum); Crowder v. Hous.
Auth., 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with the district court that an
apartment building auditorium constituted a limited public forum). Finally, the D.C.
Circuit has failed to locate any designated or limited public fora. See generally cases
cited infra notes 223, 250.
191. See, e.g., United Food & Commer. Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest
Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding the state agency created
a designated public forum and failed to show a compelling reason for excluding
plaintiff's controversial advertisement).
192. Chiu v. Piano indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 347 (5th Cir. 2001).
193. Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1999).
194. Chi. Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 704 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating that, if the First Amendment handcuffs the effective exploitation of commercially
valuable public property, government will have an incentive to sell it to a private
company, which will not be cabined by the First Amendment).
195. 5 F.3d 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1993).




B. Courts That Have Located the Limited Public Forum Under the
Designated Public Forum but Applied Only Rational Basis Review
to Limited Public Fora
In the second category are those courts that have located the limited
public forum in the category of either designated public forum or
nonpublic forum but in either case have subjected limited public fora to
only rational basis review. Courts that have followed this path include
the Second, 198 Fifth,'99 Seventh, 00 and Ninth20' Circuits.
The Ninth Circuit's recent case of DiLoreto v. Downey Unified
School District Board of Education20 2 serves as a paradigm of this
analysis. In DiLoreto, the plaintiff paid $400 to place an
"advertisement" on a high school baseball field fence.20 3  The
"advertisement" consisted mostly of the Ten Commandments. 20 4 The
school removed the advertisement for fear of provoking controversy. °5
The school also excluded proposed ads for alcohol and taverns, and any
ads by Planned Parenthood.20 6 The court found that the baseball field
was a limited public forum, limited to certain subjects.20 7 The court
placed this limited forum in the category of nonpublic forum, however,
and subjected the school district's actions to reasonableness review.
208
The court began its analysis in familiar fashion by stating that there
are three types of public fora: the traditional public forum, the designated
public forum, and the nonpublic forum.20 9 The court defined a traditional
public forum as a place that has been traditionally available for public
expression 210 and a designated public forum as a nontraditional forum
that government intentionally opens to public discourse, to which strict
scrutiny review applies. 21 1 According to the court, all remaining public
property is a nonpublic forum, which is subject to only rational basis
review. 2 12 This distinction was based on Lamb's Chapel and
198. See Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2001).
199. See Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2001).
200. See DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 575 (7th Cir. 2001).
201. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir.
1999).
202. 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999).
203. Id. at 962.
204. Id
205. Id.
206. Id. at 963.
207. The court found that the field was limited mainly to those that helped raise
money for the school in a non-controversial way. Id. at 962.
208. Id. at 965.
209. Id. at 964.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 964-65.
212. Id. at965.
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Rosenberger, which the court interpreted as standing for the proposition
that a limited public forum is a nonpublic forum that government opens
to certain groups or topics and then limits as it sees fit.
213
The DiLoreto court then stated the maxim from Cornelius that
government does not create a designated public forum simply by
permitting limited discourse.214 Rather, government must intend to
create a public forum.21 5 In determining this subjective element, the
court is supposed to look to various objective factors-the nature of the
property, the policy and practices of government, and the compatibility
of the property with expressive activity.216  Under this reasoning, if
government decides to allow commercial advertising but not political
speeches or religious preaching, it means that government did not intend
to designate the place as a public forum (open to all speech), and thus
government can place such restrictions on the property even if the
property is compatible with such expressive activity.
Applying this standard to the case before it, the court found that
government did not intend to create a public forum for all expressive
activity because it clearly excluded speech of certain kinds.2 17 Instead,
government intended to created a limited public forum that would be
closed to some-those who wanted to post controversial
advertisements. 1 8 Thus, the court found the baseball field fence to be a
nonpublic forum open for a limited purpose-to raise money. 219 Because
government had not opened the forum to a discussion about religion, the
plaintiff had no right to use the forum for religious expression.22 0 The
court found the restriction to be a permissible content-based
regulation.22'
Like the methodology that equates designated and limited public
fora, the Ninth Circuit's line of interpretation is also problematic. Rather
than view the limited public forum as a forum that is at least "half-open"
to expressive activity, the Ninth Circuit chose to view it as "half-closed"
to expressive activity. As such, the court was able to relocate the limited
public forum to the category of nonpublic forum, which had traditionally
been viewed as entirely closed (or at least nearly so) to expressive
213. Id. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in a later case, this leads to the strange
semantic result that a limited public forum is thus not actually a public forum. Hopper v.
City ofPasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001).
214. DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 965.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. That is, speech dealing with alcohol, birth control, and religion. Id. at 967.
218. Id.
219. Id. at966.





The problem with this relocation is that many fora, which are not
exactly half-closed, that would otherwise fall into the limited public
forum category may now slip through the cracks of the judicial system.
Although courts in this category are generally less hesitant to stick a
"limited public forum" label on a location, 223 the Ninth Circuit has
222. See Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13362, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2000), vacated, No. 00-9054, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5281 (2d Cir. 2001).
223. A LexisNexis search conducted on December 15, 2002, comparing the number
of limited public fora actually found by the various courts in relation to the number of
cases in which one of the parties alleged a limited public forum, indicates that circuit
courts falling into this category are much more likely to classify a particular location as a
"limited public forum" under their definition of the term. The Second Circuit named six
limited public fora in twenty-two limited public forum cases. Amandola v. Town of
Babylon, 251 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that the Town's written policy
constituted a limited public forum); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d
502, 509 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding school building constituted a limited public forum),
rev'd, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Full Gospel Tabernacle v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 27, 164 F.3d 829,
830 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming that school facilities constituted a limited public forum);
Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding school auditorium to be a limited public forum), overruled in part by Good
News, 533 U.S. 98; Lebron v. AMTRAK, 69 F.3d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that,
perhaps, a Penn Station display constituted a limited public forum limited to commercial
purposes); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 388 (2d
Cir. 1992) (finding school facilities constituted limited public fora but not for religious
uses), rev'd, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). The Fifth Circuit named three limited fora in eighteen
limited public forum cases. Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937, 941
(5th Cir. 2000) (finding school facilities constituted a limited public forum); Gay Student
Servs. v. Tex. A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1332 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding university
campus to be at least a limited public forum); Ysleta Fed'n of Teachers v. Ysleta Indep.
Sch. Dist., 720 F.2d 1429, 1433 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding school mail system constituted a
limited public forum). The Seventh Circuit did not name any limited public fora in
eleven potential limited public forum cases. The Ninth Circuit named twelve limited
public fora in twenty-five public forum cases. Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding school created a limited public forum by allowing some students to use the
school's' facilities); Culbertson v. Oakridge Sch. Dist. No. 76, 258 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding elementary school constituted a limited public forum); Gentala v. City
of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the City's civics events fund
constituted a limited public forum), overruled in part by Good News, 533 U.S. 98;
Rounds v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding
university created a limited public forum); NAACP v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317, 1322 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding voter's pamphlet was a limited public forum); Zimmerman v.
Nakatani, No. 90-16158, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30556, at *6 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1991)
(stating that the state fair was a limited public forum, although this was not the principal
issue in the case); Geary v. Renne, 914 F.2d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding voter's
pamphlet constituted a limited public forum); Kaplan v. County of Los Angeles, 894 F.2d
1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding voter's pamphlet to be a limited public forum); San
Diego Committee Against Registration & the Draft (CARD) v. Governing Bd. of
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding student
newspaper to be a limited public forum); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d
560, 581 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that the Starlight Bowl constituted a limited public
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recently taken this methodology one step further and said that the terms
"limited public forum" and "nonpublic forum" are interchangeable and
that the distinction between the two was purely a semantic one with no
analytic difference.
224
Even more troubling, the DiLoreto court has set a very difficult
standard for anyone seeking to challenge a restriction when government
did not dedicate the property to each and every kind of expressive
activity imaginable.225 As long as government excludes some kind of
expressive activity from its forum, it remains safe to exclude them all.
22 6
This methodology, like that of the first category, also discourages
government from opening a forum to all by providing clear disincentives
for doing so, coupled with clear incentives for its closing the forum.
A perhaps even more convoluted method of limited public forum
doctrine analysis has very lately appeared in one of the Second Circuit's
most recent public forum doctrine cases, Perry v. McDonald.227 In
determining what type of forum motor vehicle license plates constituted,
the court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a limited public
forum as a subcategory of the designated public forum.228 Instead of
subjecting limited designated public fora to strict scrutiny review,
however, the court stated that government restrictions in a limited public
forum need be only reasonable rather than compelling.229
This approach raises similar problems to that of the DiLoreto court.
First, this approach makes it too easy for government to promulgate
speech-restrictive regulations.23° Second, this methodology succeeds
only in making public forum doctrine analysis even more convoluted.
forum); United States v. Albertini, 710 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding
military open house constituted a "temporary public forum"), rev'd, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
See generally cases cited supra notes 190, 250.
224. Gentala, 213 F.3d 1055.
225. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part in the judgment) (stating that the requirements for a
designated public forum are so stringent as practically to render the category devoid of
any content, and predicting that few, if any, types of property other than those already
recognized as public fora will be accorded such status).
226. See, e.g., Pichelmann v. Madsen, 31 Fed. Appx. 322, 327 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating
that the university e-mail system at issue was not a limited public forum because it was
not open indiscriminately to the general public).
227. 280 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001).
228. Id. at 167 n.4 (citing Gen. Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273,
278 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997)).
229. Id. (citing Gen. Media Communications, 131 F.3d at 278 n.6). This view is also
shared by the court in Pichelmann. Pichelmann, 31 Fed. Appx. at 327.
230. Although the Second Circuit classified six locations as limited public fora under
its pre-Perry analysis, see cases cited supra note 219, in only one of these cases did
government fail the rational basis test. Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339,




According to traditional public forum doctrine guidelines, designated
public fora receive strict scrutiny review.231 Here, however, the court
subjects what it deems a type of designated public forum to rational basis
review, which had previously been reserved for only nonpublic fora.
232
This approach empties the limited designated public forum classification
of meaning and makes the limited public forum a designated public
forum in name only.
C. Courts That Have Located the Limited Public Forum Under Both
the Designated and the Nonpublic Fora
In the third category are those courts that, confused by the shifting
between the designated and the nonpublic fora, have located the "limited
public forum" in both places.233 These courts have said that both
designated and nonpublic fora may be considered to be limited.234 The
main proponent of this approach is the Tenth Circuit.235
In Summum v. Callaghan,236 a county and its commissioners
attempted to exclude a church group from constructing a religious
monolith on the grounds of the county courthouse.237 In determining that
the county had created a limited public forum, the court cited both
Widmar, in which the Court found a limited public forum and applied
strict scrutiny, and Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, in which the Court
found limited public fora but applied only a rational basis test.238 The
Court tried to delineate the parameters of the designated public forum by
pointing out that, in determining whether government had created a
designated public forum, courts must examine several factors. 239 These
factors include the purpose of the forum, the extent of the use of the
240forum, and the intent of government. In examining the extent of the
use requirement, the court noted that, in order to create a designated
public forum, government would have to allow some kind of "general
access" to the forum in question, either to the general public or to a
certain group of individuals.2 41 "Selective access" or "limited discourse"
will not qualify a forum as a designated public forum, but rather will
231. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983).
232. See, e.g., id. at 46.
233. See Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
234. See id. at 914.
235. See id.
236. 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
237. ld. at 910.
238. Id. at 914-15.
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242
keep it in the nonpublic forum category.
In examining the third factor, the intent of government, the court
identified two additional factors to help discern intent: the policy and
practice of government and the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity. 24 3 When the policy or practice at
issue operates selectively to limit access to the forum-for example, by
requiring individuals to apply for permission to use the forum--or when
the principal purpose of the forum would be disrupted by expressive
activity, the court will be reluctant to find that government designated a
forum.
24 4
In applying these factors to the case before it, the court found that,
because government had not opened a designated public forum, the
plaintiff could not prove a designated public forum for a limited purpose
and thus could not derive the benefit of a strict scrutiny standard of
245review.
The court then looked to whether government had created a
nonpublic forum of the limited variety, which the court called a "limited
public forum., 24 6  The court recognized that the boundary between a
designated public forum for a limited purpose and a limited public forum
is far from clear.247 Because the plaintiff failed to allege that government
had created a designated public forum, it was unnecessary to differentiate
between the two. 248 The court found that the county did create a limited
public forum but, because the county engaged in viewpoint-based
discrimination, it did not have to subject the county's actions to the
reasonableness test.
249
This approach raises problems similar to those raised by the Ninth
Circuit in DiLoreto. By mandating that the plaintiff prove a designated
public forum before a designated public forum of a limited type can be
shown, the court set a high bar for plaintiffs. 250 This approach seems to
confuse the designated public forum with something like a "dedicated
public forum" by saying that a designated public forum must be a place
242. Id.
243. Id. at 916.
244. Id.
245. Id. The only thing that the plaintiff could point to was that the courthouse had
allowed someone to post a Ten Commandments monolith on its lawn. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 916 n.14.
248. Id. at 916.
249. Id.
250. A LexisNexis search conducted on December 15, 2002, indicates that the Tenth
Circuit named only one designated public forum in twelve potential designated public
forum cases. Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding senior citizen's center constituted a designated public forum). See
generally cases cited supra notes 190, 223.
2003]
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or channel of communication dedicated to expressive activity. 25' At the
same time, by placing what the Tenth Circuit called the "limited public
forum" in the nonpublic forum category, the court again faces the
problem of allowing government to restrict speech in almost any way it
wants without having to face meaningful constitutional consequences.252
D. Courts That Have Located the Limited Public Forum Under the
Designated Public Forum but Make the Standard of Review
Dependent upon the Speaker's Class
In the fourth category are those courts that have classified limited
public fora as designated public fora, but have made the standard of
review dependent upon whether the would-be speaker falls inside or
outside the class established by government. The two circuits that have
split the standard of review for limited designated public fora have done
so based on two different aspects: the speaker's relationship to the
selected class, 253 and the selection of the class itself.
254
1. The Fourth Circuit's Approach
In Warren v. Fairfax County,255 the Fourth Circuit established two
different standards applicable to "limited designated public forums." In
Warren, the plaintiff filed for a permit to put up a holiday display in a
mall, which adjoined a government complex by a sidewalk.256
According to the court, the mall constituted a traditional public forum
because as an "open public thoroughfare" it possessed the physical
characteristics of a traditional public forum. 7 Thus, although the court
did not have to attempt to unravel the mystery of the limited public
forum doctrine, it nonetheless stated the standards that applied.
251. It is interesting to note that several courts have referred to the designated public
forum category as a "dedicated public forum." See, e.g., Pfeifer v. City of West Allis, 91
F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259 (E.D. Wis. 2000). It seems, however, that these courts use the
terms "designated" and "dedicated" interchangeably, without meaning any distinction.
See, e.g., id. (stating that a "dedicated public forum" may be created for a limited
purpose).
252. Of the two limited public fora that the Tenth Circuit has named, neither of the
governmental entities conclusively failed the rational basis test. See Pryor v. Coats, 203
F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2000); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 919 (10th Cir. 1997)
(remanding the case to the lower court to determine whether the county
unconstitutionally discriminated against plaintiffs speech on the basis of plaintiffs
viewpoint).
253. See Fighting Finest v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 225-28 (2d Cir. 1996).
254. See Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 188 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
255. 196 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 189.
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The court began on a contradictory note by remarking that limited
public fora are synonymous with designated public fora but then stating
that limited public fora are a subset of designated public fora. 8 It then
noted that two levels of review apply to limited public fora.259 Instead of
trying to subject the limited public forum to either of the single standards
of review of the other circuits, the court broke the governing standard for
limited public fora into two distinct categories, which the court labeled
"internal" and "external. 260
The court called the first standard the "internal standard," which
would apply if the excluded speaker falls within the class to which the
limited public forum has been made generally available. 261 Thus, the
class itself is treated as a traditional public forum to which strict scrutiny
applies.262 The court did not, however, address the standard that should
be given if a speaker were to fall outside the established class.
The court called the second standard the "external standard," which
places restrictions on the government's initial ability to designate the
class.263 The court noted that the Supreme Court has yet to state clearly
what these external limitations are, 264 but reasoned that it made sense to
subject the designation to only rational basis review, because property
lacking affirmative government designation would be treated as a
nonpublic forum.265 Once again, the court was not able to put this two-
pronged standard into practice, however. Because the court found the
mall to be a traditional public forum,266 the court did not have to reach
the issue.
2. The Second Circuit's Approach
The Second Circuit has similarly fashioned a two-level method of
analysis for limited public fora,267 although the two levels differ from
those of the Fourth Circuit. Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit
has also based its standard of review on whether the excluded speaker
belonged to the class for whose benefit the forum was created.268 If the
excluded speaker falls within the class, the government's restriction





263. Id. at 194.
264. ld.
265. Id
266. Id. at 189.




should be subjected to the same strict scrutiny review that usually applies
to traditional public fora.269 If the speaker does not fall within the
designated class, however, the government's regulation is subjected only
to rational basis review.270 The court did not have occasion to test its
double level of review, however, as the court concluded that the forum at
issue-police department bulletin boards-constituted a nonpublic
forum.
271
V. Out of the Confusion Emerges a Proposed Solution
While the Second Circuit seems to have abandoned its two-pronged
limited forum analysis in one of its most recent decisions, Perry v.
McDonald,272 its Fighting Finest standard nonetheless shows promise, as
does the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Warren. For the most
comprehensive resolution to the mystery of the limited public forum,
courts should apply a combination of the two standards, with two internal
standards of review and one external standard of review.
A. A Proposed Relocation of the Limited Public Forum Category
To implement this combined standard of review, a court must first
find that a limited public forum has been created. In order to make this
analysis easier, courts should agree on the location of the limited public
forum. Traditionally, courts have tended to locate the limited public
forum either under the designated public forum or more recently under
the nonpublic forum (or at times both). Both of these classifications can
raise difficulties. Both the Fourth and Second Circuits have located the
limited public forum under the category of designated public forum, but,
in some jurisdictions, this location has become problematic as courts
have interpreted it to mean that, in order to prove a limited designated
public forum, a plaintiff must first prove that a designated public forum
is open to the public at large or to all expressive activity in general.273 In
contrast, placing the limited public forum in the category of nonpublic
forum automatically subjects the limited public forum to rational basis
review, which does not seem to fit with the principle that a limited public
forum is opened, to some extent, for expressive activity.
A possible solution to the limited public forum location conundrum
is to refer to the limited public forum as its own distinct category to
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 230-32.
272. 280 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001).
273. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 967 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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describe those fora that have been opened to some expressive activity
and that are neither traditional, designated, or nonpublic fora. That is to
say, a limited public forum would be neither a place that has always been
used primarily for public debate (a traditional public forum), nor a place
that government opens to the public in general for expressive activity (a
designated public forum), nor a place that government selectively opens
on a permission-only basis to expressive activity (a nonpublic forum). A
limited public forum would be a location or channel of communication
that has been opened to some segment of the public, though not the
public at large. This solution would ensure that the limited public forum
does not become too fused or confused with either the designated or the
nonpublic forum.
As a corollary to this solution, courts can eliminate the designated
public forum category or relocate it as a subset of the traditional public
forum category to make public forum analysis less complicated.
Technically, the designated public forum, to the extent that it refers to
property that has been designated as available for expressive activity for
the general public, is redundant. Such property would fit into the
"government fiat" part of the traditional public forum definition, under
which property that has been dedicated to expressive activity by
government agreement qualifies as a traditional public forum.
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Although eliminating the designated public forum entirely might prove
confusing, relocating the designated public forum under the traditional
public forum would be more consistent with the original definitions of
both a traditional and a designated public forum.
B. A Proposed Dual Standard of Review for the New Limited Public
Forum
Much of the confusion that accompanies the limited public forum
arises because it is closely related to both a designated public forum and
a nonpublic forum.275 A limited public forum is like a designated public
forum to those who have been allowed access to the property for
expressive activity, but, at the same time, it is like a nonpublic forum to
those who have not been allowed access.
In order to help resolve this confusion, courts should recognize both
of these aspects of the limited public forum by subjecting the limited
public forum to two standards of review depending on the excluded
speaker's relationship to the selected class. If the speaker falls within the
274. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
275. Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov. Ass'n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344,
1350 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (noting that a limited public forum is a
combination of the traditional and the nonpublic fora).
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selected class, the government's exclusion should be subjected to strict
scrutiny review, since the forum would be akin to a designated public
forum from the perspective of the excluded speaker's class.2 76  This
would eliminate the problem of giving government an incentive to close
the forum for fear of being subjected to strict scrutiny review, as
government will only be subjected to this standard if the excluded
speaker falls within the same class. In such cases the government's
regulation would likely have been subject to strict scrutiny review
without an internal limited public forum standard, because, if someone
who falls within the already-established class is excluded, courts are
likely to find viewpoint discrimination and apply a higher level of
scrutiny.2 77 The proposed internal standard of strict scrutiny for those
falling within the selected class would thus protect against what the
Supreme Court has determined to be the most invidious kind of speech
278suppression.
On the other hand, if the would-be speaker does not fall within the
established class, the government's exclusion should be subject only to a
rational basis review. 279 The fact that a speaker is located outside of the
designated class suggests that government has refrained from viewpoint
discrimination, but has excluded the speaker on the basis of the subject
matter of the speech in general. This would be a permissible exclusion if
there is a legitimate reason to exclude speech of a particular type from
the property.28° With only these two internal standards for exclusions
from limited public forum, a problem might arise in the form of the
government's deciding to draw the boundaries of the class so narrowly as
to exclude all individuals except a select few. This is when an additional
"external" standard comes into play. Once a court determines that a
speaker falls outside a particular class, it should then examine the
government's designation of the class before concluding that the
government's exclusion was reasonable.281  The government's
276. This accords with the teachings of both Perry and the Equal Protection cases,
which provide that, in a public forum, an Equal Protection claim will be given strict
scrutiny review. Carey v. Brown, 47 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). If there is no public
forum created, however, no fundamental right has been implicated by the selective
access, and strict scrutiny review is not available. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 810.
277. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995).
278. See id. at 830.
279. This accords with the observation in Cornelius that, under limited public forum
analysis, property remains a nonpublic forum as to all unspecified uses. Deeper Life
Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
280. Grayned v. City of Rockford,.408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
281. This accords with current public forum doctrine analysis, which has not yet
established what level of scrutiny should apply to the government's delineation of the
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formulation of the class should be subjected to a rational basis review,
asking if government was reasonable in drawing the boundaries of the
class as it did. If the boundaries seem reasonable, then the speaker's
exclusion should be subject to an independent rational basis review.
VI. Conclusion
The cases that have attempted to examine the intermediate
categories of public fora highlight a great irony of the public forum
doctrine. The doctrine's mantra is "location, location, location,, 282 and
yet one of the most perplexing problems plaguing the public forum
doctrine is a matter of location: where in the typology of public fora
should courts locate the designated and limited public fora?
The interpretive problems facing courts today go beyond mere
matters of location, however, as the natures of the intermediate
categories themselves are anything but certain. Although all courts have
generally agreed that some intermediate category exists between the
extremes of the traditional and nonpublic fora, they have become
fractured as to the identity and qualities of this intermediate category.
Further, while most courts have recognized both a designated and a
limited public forum, the courts are in utter disagreement as to how the
two relate to one another. This relationship is of primary importance to
public forum analysis, as the classification of the limited public forum
under either the designated or nonpublic forum dictates the standard of
review for all property qualifying as a limited public forum.
Separating the limited public forum from both the designated and
nonpublic fora and developing its own category will dispel the current
confusion surrounding its location. Any property or channel of
communication qualifying as a limited public forum should be analyzed
using a two-pronged level of analysis. First, the court should determine
whether the excluded speaker falls within the class selected by
government. If the speaker comes within the parameters of this class, the
court should subject the government's restriction to strict scrutiny
review. If the speaker fails to come within this class, the court should
then determine whether the government's designation of the class was
acceptable class. See Denver Area Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n, 578 U.S. 727, 750 (1996) ("Our cases have not yet
determined, however, that [the] government's decision to dedicate a public forum to one
type of content or another is necessarily subject to the highest level of scrutiny.").
282. See, e.g., Matthew D. McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public Forum: A Modest
Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REv. 929, 932 (2000) ("When the state
places restrictions on the content of speech taking place on government property, a
court's analysis of the location of the speech, more than any other factor, will determine
whether or not the restriction is constitutional. It's not so much what you say, but where
you say it that counts.").
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itself a reasonable decision. If it was, the court should finally look to
whether the speaker's exclusion from the class was reasonable.
Although there are as of yet no statistics to test either the Second or
Fourth Circuit's two-pronged standard of review, it seems likely that, by
combining and employing these two standards, courts would foster a
more speech-protective environment. It is only by more clearly
delineating the boundaries and natures of the limited public forum in this
way that the name "limited public forum" can truly have meaning,
proving that there is indeed something in a name.
